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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-3874 
___________ 
 
MITCHELL HOWARD, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
STEPHEN CHATCAVAGE; BONASS; RICHARD SPAIDE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 12-cv-01562) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 19, 2014 
 
Before:  FUENTES, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  June 20, 2014) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se litigant Mitchell Howard appeals the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment to the Appellees.  For the reasons set forth below, we will summarily 
affirm. 
2 
 
 Howard filed this action in the Middle District of Pennsylvania in August 2012.  
He alleged that two corrections officers and one unit manager at State Correctional 
Institution – Mahanoy, where he is currently incarcerated, violated the Eighth 
Amendment in failing to protect him from an attack by a fellow prisoner.  Howard was 
charged with a misconduct as a result of the fight, but that misconduct was later 
dismissed by a hearing examiner.  Howard did not file a grievance with the prison 
regarding his allegation of an Eighth Amendment violation. 
 The defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, or in the alternative 
for summary judgment limited to the issue of exhaustion.  They argued that they were 
entitled to summary judgment because Howard did not exhaust his administrative 
remedies on his failure-to-protect claim, as 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) requires.  They included 
a declaration from the prison’s grievance administrator stating that Howard had filed no 
grievance related to this Eighth Amendment claim, nor indeed any grievance at all since 
2005.  Howard opposed the motion; he suggested that he reasonably believed his 
obligation to exhaust was fulfilled when the hearing examiner dismissed the misconduct 
brought against him for fighting, and that this reasonable misunderstanding should not 
preclude his claim. 
 The District Court ruled that Howard had indisputably failed to exhaust 
administrative remedies with respect to his Eighth Amendment claim, which was a fatal 
flaw under § 1997e(a).  It granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and 
closed the case.  Howard filed a timely notice of appeal.   
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 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our review of the District 
Court’s order granting summary judgment is plenary.  See State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. 
Co. v. Pro Design, P.C., 566 F.3d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2009).  Summary judgment is 
appropriate if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there 
is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  We will summarily affirm the District Court’s grant 
of summary judgment because this appeal presents no substantial question.  See I.O.P. 
10.6.   
 Incarcerated litigants must exhaust administrative remedies fully before they may 
file complaints that challenge the conditions of their confinement.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997e(a).  Exhaustion is mandatory, even if the administrative process cannot provide 
the prisoner with the relief he seeks.  See Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 75 (3d Cir. 2000).  
Here, the defendants properly raised Howard’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies 
as an affirmative defense.  See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007) (failure to 
exhaust is an affirmative defense).  Howard does not dispute that he failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies with respect to the constitutional claim at bar.  Instead, he 
suggests that he believed his appeal of the misconduct could substitute for exhaustion, 
and that this reasonable misunderstanding should not preclude his claim.  He is mistaken. 
 The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to ensure that prison officials have a 
fair opportunity to correct their own errors before the initiation of a federal case.  See 
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 94-95 (2006); see also Jones, 549 U.S. at 219.  Howard 
did not give the defendants such an opportunity here.  There is nothing in the record to 
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indicate that Howard’s appeal of the misconduct for fighting alerted prison officials to 
this independent, affirmative Eighth Amendment claim against them, much less afforded 
them the opportunity to evaluate or remedy that claim before the initiation of this case.  
Indeed, the inmate grievance process and the inmate discipline process are two separate 
tracks, the mixing of which is specifically forbidden:  “A grievance directly related to a 
specific inmate misconduct charge . . . will not be addressed through the Inmate 
Grievance System and must be addressed through Department policy DC-ADM 801, 
‘Inmate Discipline.’”1  See Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Administrative 
Directive 804, Inmate Grievance System Procedures Manual at § 1.A.7.  Nor has Howard 
demonstrated that the grievance process was unavailable to him.2   
 Because the exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to filing a 
complaint in this context, and because Howard indisputably failed to do so, this appeal 
presents no substantial question.  We will summarily affirm the District Court’s order 
granting summary judgment to the defendants. 
                                              
1 Howard’s reliance on Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670 (2d Cir. 2004) to support his 
excusable-mistake theory is inapposite, as Giano concerned a prisoner whose appeal of a 
misconduct was denied, in a New York correctional institution with a different system of 
prison regulations. 
 
2 We have excused the failure to exhaust in limited circumstances when the grievance 
procedure is unavailable to the prisoner.  See, e.g., Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 113 
(3d Cir. 2002) (prison officials’ instruction that plaintiff must delay filing grievance 
would render the grievance procedure unavailable); Camp v. Brennan, 219 F.3d 279, 
280-81 (3d Cir. 2000) (correctional officers impeding plaintiff’s ability to file a grievance 
renders grievance procedure unavailable).  In his brief supporting this appeal, Howard 
asserts, baldly and for the first time, that grievance procedures were unavailable to him.  
But he fails to describe any circumstances demonstrating this unavailability, and the 
record does not support such a proposition. 
